Stable International Environmental Agreements An Analytical Approach

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School of Management, University of China University of Science, Beijing, 100080, China Subscribe to this free journal for more articles on the subject. . *The research is supported by the Centre interuniversitaire de RECHERCHE en économie quantitative (CIREQ). . M. Finus and B. Rundshagen, Endogenous coalition formation global pollution control, working paper, FEEM, Nota di Lavoro 2001, 43. Journal of Systems Science and Complexity Volume 21, pages184-190 (2008) Quoting this article Here`s an overview of the subscription content, log in to check access….